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Abstract  
 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) brought to life Twinning, a successful public 
sector reform tool according to the EU. The introduction of Twinning gave EU agents the role 
of Twinning consultants: they aim to provide the necessary technical support and expert 
knowledge to instigate social learning and build institutional capacity within beneficiary 
countries. While the EU has spent over two billion euros on this tool, scholars have neglected 
to study the role of the EU Twinning consultants in the realization of externally supported 
public sector reform. This study will thus be the first academic study that zooms in on the role 
of the EU Member States experts in realizing the goals of Twinning projects. Through 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this thesis examines nineteen different Twinning projects 
where the Netherlands served as a leading partner. By triangulating official documents with 
the experiences of officials in the field, this study advances the existing literature on public 
sector reform and provides insights on how externally supported public sector reforms are 
realized. This research found that the quality of the Twinner, and the level of sector 
politicization in combination with philosophy of governance similarity, are sufficient 
conditions that can make Twinning triumphant. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
The road to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) gave life to institution-building 
instruments to facilitate the transfer of all the EU standards and rules, or as they are called, the 
acquis (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004; Bailey and De Propris 2004; Tulmets 2004). In 
1996, it became clear that the administrative capacity in the 2004 EU candidate member states 
needed to be strengthened to make the countries admissible to the European Union community 
(Dimitrova 2002). To aid the candidate member states the EU established, amongst other 
things, the Twinning instrument. Twinning aims to transfer the knowledge and experience of 
the ‘best’ public administration practices from EU Member States to a beneficiary country 
(BC). Furthermore, it aspires to foster Europeanization where top-down European policy-
making intends to adjust the local norms, rules and procedures in a beneficiary country towards 
a European standard (Börzel 2003: 2). Finally, it seeks to stimulate European integration 
through the bottom-up interaction between states.  
 
The introduction of Twinning in 1998 gave EU agents the role of Twinning consultants: they 
aim to provide the necessary technical support and expert knowledge to instigate social 
learning and to build institutional capacity within the BC. Currently, Twinning takes place 
through demand-based 36-month-long projects: a BC drafts a Twinning Fiche, to which a EU 
Member State (MS) can respond with a proposal that outlines the technical know-how they 
will be able to provide. The BC then selects one of the MS’s proposals with whom they create 
a detailed work program (European Commission 2006: 4). The Twinning exercise is often led 
by a consortium of two or three Member States (MSs), each providing complementary 
technical assistance. The EU believed by establishing such an instrument, it would provide the 
necessary support to candidate countries to “develop their own capacity to meet the obligations 
of European Union membership” (europa.eu 1998). The projects set out to work towards 
adjusting the beneficiary countries’ “structures, human resources and management skills” to 
make them fit for full participation within the EU (European Commission 2006: 4). In short, 
the EU hopes that Twinning leads to tailored knowledge transfer to the BCs instead of an “one-
size-fits-all” approach.  
 
Since the inception of the instrument in 1998 over 2,700 Twinning projects have taken place. 
The list of beneficiary countries (BCs) has been expanded in 2004 to include the European 
Neighborhood countries, who do not qualify for EU membership, but wish to establish closer 
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ties to the EU (Bouscharain and Moreau 2012: v). The focus of these projects has a wide range: 
from enhancing the role of the parliaments in Bosnia and Herzegovina to mapping real estate 
property in Jordan. The EU funds all these Twinning projects and has since the instrument’s 
inception spent over two billion euros on Twinning (DG Near 2016). 
 
While the European Union employs review missions that examine Twinning projects on a 
regular basis, independent and/or scholarly research on Twinning is close to non-existent. The 
limited number of academic studies that have been conducted on the Twinning instrument 
predominantly concentrate around the 2004 EU enlargement (Königová 2003; Papadimitriou 
and Phinnemore 2004; Tulmets 2005; Bailey and De Propris 2004; Tomolová and Tulmets 
2006). Yet, the Twinning instrument has experienced some significant changes after its first 
few years of operation. Additionally, most of the scholarly evaluations zoom in on the countries 
hosting the projects, the so-called beneficiary countries, but neglect the role of the expert 
sending EU Member States during the Twinning project. Hence, this study will be the first 
academic medium-N study that zooms in on the role of the EU Member States experts in 
realizing the Twinning project’s goals. This study will investigate: under what conditions are 
European Union Member States experts able to realize public sector reforms in beneficiary 
countries of the Twinning instrument?  
 
The overall purpose of this research is to contribute to current public sector reform literature 
and provide insights on the necessary and sufficient conditions that enable EU MSs experts to 
support public sector reform through the Twinning projects. By conducting an analysis that 
spans across a wide range of beneficiary countries, the findings provide insights on the role of 
the governance similarity between the MS and BC in attainment of the Twinning goals. Finally, 
the discovery of the key conditions that foster externally supported public sector reform can 
assist EU policy makers in changing the Twinning instrument to alter its practices to increase 
Twinning’s quality, success and sustainable impact. 
 
To answer the research question, I present an exploratory study that focuses on the Netherlands 
as the EU Twinning partner. Nineteen different Twinning projects are analyzed, which span 
across six out of the fourteen Twinning sectors. The analysis is based on both official document 
analysis, such as the Final Reports produced at the end of each Twinning project, and eleven 
face-to-face interviews with Dutch officials who have been involved with Twinning projects. 
Subsequently, this triangulation of data provides the input for Ragin’s (2000) qualitative 
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comparative analysis (QCA) approach. QCA derives the combinations of causal conditions 
under which EU experts are able to realize externally supported public sector reforms 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 3).  
 
The scope of the analysis was limited by data access, as the European Union prescribes that 
Final Twinning reports are only allowed to be shared once permission has been given by all 
parties involved in the Twinning project. Furthermore, due to data restriction rules, no official 
contact information of the Twinning participants is allowed to be shared. Therefore, obtaining 
the necessary data in order to research Twinning is difficult and time-consuming. Due to these 
circumstances, the thesis only focuses on one European Member State as leading Twinning 
partner. The downside of such a case selection is that the findings are less generalizable across 
EU Member States. Furthermore, the selection of the projects included in this analysis project  
had to depend on the interest and willingness to cooperate of the Dutch Twinning partners. 
This case selection might have biased the results as those with positive experiences with 
Twinning might be more likely to share their experiences than the organizations that did not 
have a positive experience with Twinning. Yet, to account for this bias, two of the eleven 
officials interviewed represented organizations that pulled out from participating in future 
Twinning projects for various reasons. Despite these limitations, this thesis zooms in on an 
illustrative sample of Dutch Twinning involvement and provides a springboard for more in-
depth, cross-country analyses of the Twinning instrument.  
  
To answer the research question, this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews what 
the Twinning instrument entails and how it operates. Chapter 3 links the empirical data on 
Twinning to the scholarly perspective on Twinning and public sector reform in general. 
Building upon existing public sector reform literature, three hypotheses are developed 
pertaining the role of EU MSs experts in realizing public sector reforms in beneficiary countries 
of the Twinning instrument. Chapter 4 outlines the research approach of this study by providing 
an overview of the design, the chosen research method and the operationalization of the 
variables. Chapter 5 first presents the results obtained by the QCA, and subsequently interprets 
these results by linking them to the hypotheses stated in Chapter 3. This chapter also discusses 
the limitations of this research. Chapter 6 sums up the research by providing a conclusion and 
a discussion of avenues for further research.  
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Chapter 2: The Twinning instrument  
 
The first step in answering the research question is to fully understand what the Twinning 
instrument is and how it operates. This chapter will therefore provide an in-depth overview of 
the Twinning instrument. First, the chapter will zoom in on how Twinning came into being, 
then on how the instrument operates and who participates in Twinning and lastly how Twinning 
has changed since its inception in 1998.  
 
What is Twinning? 
Twinning is an EU instrument that aims to foster cooperation and the sharing of expert 
knowledge between the public administrations of EU MSs and its Twinning partners. The 
Twinning exercise does not aim to facilitate the imitation of a MS practice by the BC, but rather 
wants to assists in sharing the ‘best’ of MSs’ practices related to the acquis (Twinning Official 
1, interview, 14 September 2016). The instrument was initially established with the goal to 
assist EU candidate countries with the transposition and implementation of EU legislation 
(Bailey and De Propis 2004: 86), but was extended in 2004 to include the Eastern and Southern 
neighbors of the EU, the so-called ‘European Neighborhood countries’. Since the inception of 
the instrument in 1998, over 2,700 Twinning projects have taken place. The focus of these 
projects has ranged from assisting Romania with domestic waste management, to enhancing 
the role of parliament in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to mapping real estate property in Jordan. 
The EU funds all these projects and has spent over two billion euros on Twinning (DG Near 
2016). The EU thinks of Twinning as a key instrument for its institution-building efforts and 
as having brought BCs closer to EU values and to the acquis communautaire (Special Report 
No6/2003 2003: 22).  
 
The Start of Twinning: EU and Institution-Building 
After the collapse of communism, a number of Central and Eastern European countries 
expressed interest in joining the project of European integration. Amongst other things, the EU 
developed the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, which opened and clarified the path to EU accession 
for Central and Eastern European countries. The Copenhagen criteria outline the three criteria 
to which candidate countries had to comply with to become admissible to the EU, namely 
(ec.europa.eu 2012; European Council 1993: 13): 
1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; 
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2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the EU; 
3. ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively 
implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the 
'acquis'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
 
The 1995 Madrid Summit introduced a fourth criterion: administrative capacity (Dimitrova 
2002: 178). The formal bodies that carry out the activities and decisions of the government in 
the Central and Eastern European candidate states were perceived to be inadequate to adopt, 
implement and execute tasks, policies and institutional reforms. Hence, the European Union 
made institution-building one of its main focuses of its pre-accession strategy. Institution-
building is “an activity [which] develops the administrative structures necessary for the 
adoption and implementation of the acquis of the Union” (Dimitrova 2002: 171). To enhance 
the implementation of the acquis, the Madrid Summit suggested that the administrative 
capacity of the candidate member states had to be adjusted to foster the integration of all 
Member States (European Council 1995). The European Commission seconded its importance 
in Agenda 2000 and added it as a precondition for accession to the European Union. To develop 
this fourth pillar, the EU engaged with institution-building, which aims to “strengthen the 
democratic legitimacy of the institutions” and to “improve the effectiveness of the institutions” 
(Treaty on the European Union 2002). To facilitate this process, the EU developed several 
instruments to assist potential candidate member states with improving their institutional 
capacity and the implementation of the acquis, such as the Technical Assistance and 
Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX) and the Twinning instrument.      
 
The EU’s Institution-building Instruments  
Twinning was first introduced to the “Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies” (PHARE) program. After the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the European Union developed the demand-driven PHARE program to help 
these countries with their transition to a market economy (Bailey and de Propis 2004: 79). The 
overly complex rules and procedures related to the PHARE program led to a revision of the 
program and subsequent reforms (Commission 1997). The 1997 reform changed PHARE into 
a more accession-driven program (Commission 2003). As part of the EU institution-building 
agenda, new instruments were introduced to PHARE, including Twinning. The nature of the 
Twinning exercise was not new to the international institution-building arena. In the early 
 
	
6 
1980s, overall development cooperation results were dissatisfactory as they tended to focus too 
much on building physical institutions and formal training (Jones and Blunt 1999: 384; 
Mayhew 1998). Hence, the focus in institution-building programs shifted from enhancing 
learning on the individual level to an organizational and institutional level. This trend was also 
adopted when developing the Twinning instrument by designing the focus of the instrument on 
36-month long expert missions aimed at organizational learning. To provide more flexibility, 
the EU has also employed Twinning light projects, which only last for half a year. 
 
Twinning in practice: from Fiche to ‘Partnership’ to Project 
Twinning projects are designed to be demand-based: the beneficiary country determines what 
they need assistance with. In practice, these projects can be encouraged by both the European 
Union itself and a MS, that has been in touch with the BC’s public administration through i.e. 
bilateral work collaborations (Twinning Official 4, interview, 16 January 2017; Twinning 
Official 6, interview, 18 January 2017).     
 
The first step towards a Twinning project is the drafting of a Twinning Fiche by the BC. This 
is sent to the 28 EU National Contact points, which disseminate this call amongst all the 
Twinning contracting parties. The public administrations of EU Member States can respond to 
this call with a proposal, where they outline the technical know-how they will be able to provide 
the BC with. Often, two or three MSs write a proposal together to pool their expertise and 
provide complementary technical assistance. This pooling is usually done to increase the 
chances of winning the project and/or to have enough experts at the project’s disposal 
(Twinning Official 11, interview, 2 February 2017). The BC will then select one of these 
proposals with whom they will create a “detailed work program which will, together with its 
matching budget, form the basis of the Twinning contract” (European Commission 2006: 4). 
This selection process sometimes involves informal political deals, instigated by visits of a 
MS’s minister or an ambassador to the particular BC’s ministry to vie for the Twinning project 
(Twinning Official 6, interview, 18 January 2017). The final Twinning contract is then assessed 
by the European Commission to ensure that all mandatory results can be achieved within the 
foreseen time frame and that they are in line with the acquis, before signed by all parties. This 
entire process from fiche to partnership is visualized in Figure 1.  
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Next to the project acquisition stage, the organigram of Twinning project is rather complex. 
First of all, if two or more MSs are involved in the Twinning project, they are subdivided in 
being a leading partner and junior partner(s). The leading partner designates the Residence 
Twinning Advisor (RTA), the only person from a MS who works in the corresponding Ministry 
of the BC for the entire duration of the project (Commission 2009). This RTA is responsible 
for the day-to-day implementation of the Action Plan. The RTA is supported by a locally 
selected RTA Assistant (RTAa), and two Project Leaders (PL) who complementary supervise 
the project implementation. The PLBC is an official of the BC’s administration and coordinates 
the efforts from the side of the beneficiary country. The PLMS is chosen from one of the MSs’ 
public administrations involved and coordinates the Twinning efforts from the EU side. During 
the project, the PLMS continues to work at his/her home country’s administration, and allots a 
portion of his or her time to the project (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 September 2016). 
Some MSs’ public administrations make use of a Project Manager, who provides support to 
both the RTA and the PLMS. This role is neither officially described nor recognized in the 
Twinning Manual and is therefore not financed by the Twinning instrument. Together, the 
RTA, PLs and the project manager form the core of the Twinning project. The Project Leaders 
also coordinate the so-called Component Leaders (CL). A CL is responsible for the different 
components that are part of the project, such as capacity building and legislation. The CL from 
Figure 1. The establishment of a Twinning Contract 
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the MSs also arrange the experts who provide workshops or trainings in the BC. At the end of 
the project, a Final Report is written about the developments during the Twinning Project by 
the PLs. The organigram is shown in Figure 2.  
Throughout the Twinning project, the European Commission, and in particular the EU 
Delegation in the BC, monitor the project’s progress and provide country specific information. 
The role of the EU Delegation can also be experienced as hindrance as noted by a Twinning 
official (Twinning Official 7, interview, 19 January 2017). The imposition of additional 
bureaucratic rules and procedures, and a slow approval response rate by the EU Delegation in 
the respective country where the Twinning project took place, sometimes make it difficult to 
meet the mandatory goals (ibid).  
 
Lastly, it is important to note that the EU Twinning partners might not always be part of the 
official MS public administration. In some MSs, semi-public bodies perform the outsourced 
activities from the MS’s public administration. These bodies are called mandated bodies, and 
need to be recognized by the National Contact Point (NCP) of the MS before being able to 
become a Twinning Partner. The inclusion of mandated bodies as Twinning partners allow 
smaller Member States, that have smaller staff and expertise capacities at their public 
Figure 2. The Twinning project organigram 
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administrations, to also participate in Twinning. The Netherlands is an example of a MS where 
mandated bodies twin more often than the Dutch ministries in absolute terms (Dutch NCP, 
interview, 20 May 2016). In practice however, some recognized mandated bodies do not 
perform outsourced government activities (Twinning Official 3, interview, 13 January 2017; 
Twinning Official 8, interview, 20 January 2017). They are rather specialized in general project 
management and consequently have little in-depth knowledge of the specific sector and the 
best practices related to the acquis. Additionally, those mandated bodies often have a small 
network of experts to draw from, which may lead to insufficient staff capacity during the 
project. In the past, this has led to situations where a project that was won had to be cancelled 
due to the lack of adequate staff.  
 
The Twinners 
In theory, all twenty-eight EU Member States can participate Twinning, but in reality their 
participation varies greatly. Germany has participated the most as a leading partner with more 
than 500 times since the inception of Twinning in 1998. In contrast, smaller countries such as 
Belgium and Portugal have since 1998 served as a leading partner less than 10 times. When 
zooming on the last three years (2013-2016), similar differences can be detected (Figure 3). 
Large EU Member States such as France and Germany have participated over thirty times as a 
leading partner, while countries such as Belgium and Ireland pale in comparison. It is important 
to note that Figure 3 only captures leading partners. The figure ignores both the number of 
times that a country has participated in a consortium and the number of proposals a MS 
submitted but did not win. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
B
ul
ga
ria
C
ro
at
ia
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
C
yp
ru
s
D
en
m
ar
k
Es
to
ni
a
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
H
un
ga
ry
Ita
ly
Ir
el
an
d
La
tv
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
al
ta
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Po
la
nd
Po
rtu
ga
l
R
om
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
 
Number of Twinning Projects awarded as leading MS 2013-
2016
Number of Twinning Projects
Figure 3. Number of Twinning Projects award as Lead MS 2013-2016 
Source: DG Near (2016) 
 
	
10 
The beneficiary countries can be subdivided into two groups: the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). This latter group 
includes (potential) candidate countries, while the first one does not. The focus of the Twinning 
projects varies per group of beneficiary countries. In the IPA countries, the Twinning priority 
sectors are related to Justice and Home Affairs, Agriculture, Public Finance, Environment and 
Social Sector issues. The focus for the ENP is broader, and includes sectors such as Health, 
Transport and Energy.  
 
Noteworthy, the participation of EU Member States in Twinning greatly differs by 
geographical area. As an example, France submitted over 90 proposals as a leader for the ENP-
South region between 2005 and 2016, but only around 15 proposals for the ENP-East region. 
In contrast, Germany submitted 70 proposals for the ENP-East region, but only 20 for the ENP- 
South region (DG Near 2016). A simple explanation for this trend is geopolitical interest as 
well as historical ties to a region.  
 
Changes in Twinning 
The Twinning exercise has changed significantly in its focus, its scope and design since its 
inception in 1998. When Twinning was launched, the projects were predominantly focused on 
agriculture, environment, public finance, justice and home affairs and prepared BCs for the 
management of Structural Funds (Commission 2003: 9). From 2000 onwards, the Twinning 
focus shifted to include all sectors related to the acquis. Furthermore, as a result of an 
independent assessment of Twinning in 2000, procedural and financial rules were improved 
and the project implementation process was expedited (ibid: 10). In 2001, the Twinning 
exercise was also complimented by Twinning Light, an opportunity for beneficiary countries 
to make use of the Member States’ experience for smaller projects (Commission 2001).  
 
The list of eligible countries for Twinning has also expanded over the years. The enlargement 
of the European Union in 2004 gave the EU new neighbors, which brought along concerns 
about security, immigration, but also about political and economic opportunities. This triggered 
the EU to develop the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP): a framework that focuses on  
economic and political cooperation between the EU and its Eastern and Southern neighbors. 
The ENP borrowed significantly from the strategies of the enlargement process (Kelley 2006). 
To enhance the implementation and impact of the framework, the EU expanded its list of 
beneficiary countries of the Twinning instrument to include the ENP countries (Bouscherain 
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and Moreau 2012). While ENP countries do not qualify for EU Membership, they do wish to 
establish closer ties to the European Union. In 2002, Twinning was launched in the Western 
Balkans and Turkey (Commission 2009). And in 2004, the Twinning instrument was extended 
to the Eastern and Southern neighbors of the European Union (Bouscherain and Moreau 2012). 
This changed the Twinning instrument from a sole pre-accession instrument to a more general 
institution-building instrument.   
 
To account for these developments and to streamline efforts, the Commission regularly updates 
a Twinning Manual, a guide for implementing Twinning projects (European Commission 
2005). These Twinning rules, guidelines and procedures have been regularly updated and 
expanded (Twinning Official 2, interview, 19 October 2016). To name a few examples, (1) the 
role of the RTA Assistant was formally introduced in Twinning Manual 2007 (European 
Commission 2007), (2) Twinning Review Missions, which assess the sustainability of the 
project 6-12 months after its completion, were included in the Twinning Manual 2009 
(European Commission 2009), (3) between 2005 and 2012 the maximum number of 
assignments RTAs can participate in during their professional career has been increased from 
3 to 4 (European Commission 2005; European Commission 2012), (4) the duration of the 
drafting of the Twinning contract has been reduced from 6 to 4/5 months (European 
Commission 2012), and (5) since 2012, each Twinning project is required to host a formal 
kick-off and closure event (European Commission 2012). These changes are a response to 
recommendations following Twinning experiences, but also a result of the evaluation of 
experts contracted by the European Union (European Commission 2012: 8).  
 
Chapter conclusion 
This chapter outlined all facets of the Twinning instrument: its history, its functioning, its 
participants and its changes. It is clear that both the expert sending MSs and the BCs play an 
important role in the design and the execution of the Twinning project. The next chapter will 
zoom in on what the existing academic literature says about the Twinning instrument. It will 
then turn to a discussion of the literature on how public sector reform in general takes place, 
and in particular what the literature says about the conditions that influence the EU MSs experts 
in their ability to realize public sector reforms in beneficiary countries through the Twinning 
instrument. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework  
Chapter 2 discussed what the Twinning instrument entails and how it operates. This chapter 
will link the empirical data on Twinning with the academic perspective by presenting scholars’ 
view on the Twinning instrument. Then, this perspective will be placed within the wider public 
sector reform literature by looking at institutionalist theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and 
Rose’s (1991) lesson-drawing theory. Based on these theories, hypotheses are developed on 
the various conditions that outline when EU MSs experts are able to realize public sector 
reforms in beneficiary countries of the Twinning instrument. 
 
Twinning in Review 
A limited number of academic studies have been conducted on the Twinning instrument, 
predominantly concentrating around the 2004 EU enlargement. The studies focused on: how 
Twinning can lead to voluntary selective domestication of the governance culture of EU 
Member States with a focus on the Czech Republic (Königová 2003), the success of the 
Twinning exercise in Romania (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004), the perception and 
implementation of Twinning in Estonia and Hungary (Tulmets 2005), the success of the 
PHARE program of which Twinning used to be a component (Bailey and De Propris 2004) 
and the drawbacks and limitations for expert sending EU Member States with a focus on the 
Czech Republic (Tomolová and Tulmets 2006). Two academic studies have focused on 
Twinning in the European neighborhood countries: the role of the membership perspective in 
the success of the Twinning tool in Turkey (Bürgin 2014) and the question on the lasting impact 
of Twinning projects on administrative reform in the Eastern neighborhood (Roch 2017).  
 
Together, they discovered that the Twinning instrument is more than the assumed forced 
transfer of technical know-how and EU Member States’ governance modes. Twinning can lead 
to the voluntary adoption of EU Member States’ governance culture, including their 
experiences, expertise, procedures and structures (Königová 2003). This degree of adoption 
depends on the degree of socialization (Königová 2003; Tulmets 2005; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore 2004). The degree of socialization is, amongst others, dependent on the attitudes 
of the experts and their ability to cooperate with their BC partner (Tulmets 2005: 670-671; 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004: 634). EU experts are sometimes seen as “Brussels’ 
spies”, “arrogant”, and as receiving excessive salaries and not very competent, which hinders 
the socialization process (Tulmets 2005: 671). Additionally, the lack of country specific 
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trainings prior to the start of the project and language barriers can also be obstacles in creating 
good working relationships (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2004: 636). In the case of a lack 
of EU membership, Twinning can become more of a learning opportunity structure rather than 
a socialization tool (Bürgin 2014: 471). This form of strategic learning is less embedded in a 
socialization process, and more of a tool to achieve domestic policies. Roch’s (2017) case study 
on Moldova on the other hand argues that the Twinning instrument needs to engage with further 
adaptions to be successful in the Eastern neighborhood countries where EU Membership is 
absent.  
 
According to Tomalová and Tulmets (2006: 394) who focused on EU candidate countries in 
their study, Twinning is perceived as a win-win opportunity for the BCs and MSs. It allows the 
BC to familiarize themselves with the EU and learn the desired technical know-how, while the 
MS expands their professional network and creates future cooperation opportunities. 
Additionally, Twinning helps in changing organizational structures and elicits a change in 
policies in the BC. However, Twinning is a slow, and highly bureaucratic instrument, 
characterized by complicated procedures and tight and inflexible rules (ibid). Furthermore, the 
Twinning project time line is often too short and the receiving country often has limited 
absorption capacity to elicit substantive change. Due to these circumstances, the effectiveness 
of the Twinning instrument is contested.   
 
In all, the literature on Twinning has identified some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
instrument in realizing public sector reform. From the discussion above, it is clear that the 
expert sending MS plays an important role in the success of the Twinning project, but the 
literature does not provide an in-depth discussion of this role in itself. The rest of this chapter 
will zoom in on two dominant public sector reform theories, which provides the foundation 
that helps to identify the conditions under which EU MSs experts are able to realize public 
sector reforms through the Twinning instrument. 
 
Public Sector Reform Theory 
The changes that the Twinning instrument aims to make to the structures and policies within 
the beneficiary countries can be best understood as public sector reforms. Public sector reform 
speaks to the “deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations 
with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 
2). Public sector reform differs from a change process, as it involves an intended, strategically 
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designed alternation of a structure or process within a public sector organization (Kuipers et 
al. 2014). This reform process, driven by economic, political and social reasons, is often a slow 
process of only incremental changes (Kickert and Van der Meer 2011).  
 
To understand public sector reforms, scholars heavily rely on the institutionalist explanation 
(e.g. Pollitt and Summa 1997). DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 147) argue that reforms in 
organizations are driven by isomorphic processes, which make organizations experiencing the 
same environmental conditions similar in structure, culture and output. These processes lead 
to modification of the structures and processes of an organization, which increase its 
compatibility with its environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149). Isomorphic processes 
are captured by three different concepts: coercive isomorphism, which speaks to role of 
pressures by other actors as well as the search for legitimacy by the organization, mimetic 
isomorphism, which explains organizational similarity as responses to uncertainty, and 
normative isomorphism where professionalization serves as a mechanism to transmit 
homogeneity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). Isomorphic processes in general improve the 
chances of success and survival of organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 349). Normative 
isomorphism in particular links to the mechanism of the Twinning instrument: the interaction 
between professionals as vehicle to trigger similarity between the organizations.   
 
Another dominant theory explaining public sector reform is Rose’s (1991) lesson-drawing 
theory. The theory of lesson-drawing states that public sector reform in a country is guided by 
the lessons learned in or from a different country. This transfer of knowledge on “policy goals, 
structure and content, policy instruments or administrative techniques, institutions, ideology, 
ideas, attitudes and concepts, negative lessons” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 350) is called 
lesson-drawing. The European Union is a prominent place for lesson-drawing, as the 
cooperation within the institution forces Member States to learn about the practices of the other 
Member States and adjust their policies accordingly (Rose 1993). The type of policy transfer 
can further be subdivided in voluntary and coercive policy transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996: 344). Voluntary policy transfers takes place when a government decides to adopt a policy 
by its own free will, whereas coercive policy transfer happens when a government or 
international institution encourages or forces another government to adopt a policy. Twinning 
pertains a relatively voluntary policy transfer as the mechanism is demand-based.  
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Twinning: EU externally supported public sector reform  
The public sector literature helps to understand the mechanism of EU externally supported 
public sector reform: the deliberate (incremental) changes in structures and processes of 
beneficiary countries’ organizations supported by EU experts, which enhance the BC’s 
administrative capacity and/or promote its adoption of elements of the acquis. Based on the 
literature, three complementary explanation levels are identified to understand the mechanisms 
underlying the Twinning instrument that explicate the role EU Member States experts have in 
supporting public sector reform in the beneficiary country.   
 
The first level is the consultant/expert level, the so-called Twinner-level. The Twinning experts 
play an important role in the institution-building project process (Tulmets 2005), as they serve 
the role as norm entrepreneurs. The Twinning project is designed around the interaction 
between the BC’s and MSs’ officials, which plays an important role in establishing good 
relationships and subsequent knowledge transfer of the MSs to the BC (Freyburg 2011: 1009). 
The second level is the sector level. The type of sector influences the degree of politicization 
of the project as well as the number of veto players involved. These two factors influence the 
ability of change implementation. The third level is the institutional level. The institutional 
level influences an organization’s culture and structure, the so-called ‘philosophy of 
governance’ of the country. The differences between the philosophy of governance of the MS 
and BC affect how well lesson-drawing can take place, and the subsequent reforms which are 
informed by this lesson-drawing.     
 
(1) The Twinner Level  
The Twinner refers to the expert sent by an EU Member State to facilitate and carry out the 
Twinning process. The literature provides three possible explanation of the role of the Twinner: 
the teacher, the leader and the nobody. The teacher perspective is embedded in normative 
isomorphism, which sees socialization as a mechanism that transmits a common set of norms 
and values. This socialization takes place through the interaction in professional networks, so-
called professional socialization. Van Maanen and Schein (1977: 3) coin organizational 
socialization as “the process in which one is taught and learns ‘the ropes’ of a particular 
organizational role.” This organizational role is the European Union, and the teachers are the 
EU experts who teach the BC’s officials the ropes. This success of professional socialization 
is dependent on the support and guidance of the experts (Van Maanen and Schein 1977: 9). 
More specifically, this degree of support and guidance is dependent on the extensive expert 
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knowledge Twinners have on the topic addressed in the Twinning project. Therefore, (H1a) 
externally supported public sector reform is more likely to be realized when the Twinner 
behaves like a teacher who provides support and guidance to the BC’s officials. 
 
A counter-explanation is promoted by Kotter (1996), a leading scholar in the field of 
organizational change, who has argued that leadership is a leading factor in triggering 
organizational change. Here, the expert knowledge is secondary, and the Twinner should act 
like someone who establishes direction, aligns people, motivates and inspires people to 
instigate public sector reform (Kotter 1996: 26). According to Kotter (1996:26), organizational 
change depends 70-90% on the leadership qualities of a consultant. Charlesworth, Cook and 
Crozier (2003: 7) also argue that “effective leadership development is the key to leading 
effective change.” Christensen (2005) showed that consultants can even become a third hand 
in triggering public sector change by providing legitimate experience and knowledge, as well 
as a doses of convincing qualities. This leads to the counter-hypothesis (H1b) externally 
supported public sector reform is more likely to be realized when the Twinner behaves like a 
leader who provides direction to the BC’s officials and MSs’ experts.  
 
Other scholars have argued that the Twinner does not play a role in the realization of public 
sector reform. Humphrey (2007: 477) questions the expertise of consultants. He states that the 
expertise provided by consultants is often unverified. Additionally, Corcoran and McLaen 
(1998) have wondered if (private sector) consultants are able to provide answers to public 
sector challenges. Also, Brunsson and Olsen (1997: 192) have argued that a consultant’s 
position to bring about reform is not always weighty and thus not on equal par to serve as a 
third hand. While organizations are used to experiencing reform, the nature where these 
reforms come from is crucial in the execution and success of the reform. Due to the 
institutionalized nature of each organization, the impact a reformer will be able to make is 
rather limited. More importantly, Brunsson and Olsen (1997: 193) argue that consultants are 
“interchangeable”, as their job could also have been done by someone else. This explanation 
provides the null hypothesis (H1c): the likelihood of the realization of externally supported 
public sector reform is not dependent on the qualities and behavior of the Twinner. 
 
(2) The Sector Level  
The second level of analysis is the sector level. The literature focusing on the influence of 
interest groups illuminates that they are most influential when policies are technical, non-
 
	
17 
partisan and experience low-visibility (Smith 1995). Bozeman and Pandey (2003: 5) suggest 
that politicized topics involve a higher number of actors, leading to increased chances of 
disagreement. Tsebelis veto player theory (2002) argues that political systems can be 
categorized based on the participation of political actors, which can veto policy decisions. 
According to Tsebelis (2002: 36), veto players are “individual or collective actors whose 
agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo.” A higher number of veto players can 
hinder the reform process as agreement is necessary to elicit reform. Furthermore, the degree 
of the politicization of policy issue can also hinder this reform process. As a case in point, 
Freyburg (2011) conducted a research project amongst Moroccan officials where she 
discovered that a non-politicized Twinning project yielded a more positive socialization than 
those participating in the project that experienced a higher degree of politicization (Freyburg 
2011: 1016). This explanation demonstrates that the sector in which the experts are employed 
matters. This leads to the second hypothesis (H2): the less politicized the sector of the Twinning 
project is, the more likely externally supported public sector reform will be realized.  
 
(3) The Institutional Level   
The third level pertains the institutional level. Rose’s (1991) lesson-drawing theory argues that 
the potential transfer of a governmental program in one setting to another can also take place 
in the form of lesson-drawing. Lesson-drawing on a public administration level is more 
difficult than on a business level, as the profits are less clear and therefore increases the chances 
for normative disagreements (Rose 1991: 10). Rose argues that this disagreement can be 
overcome if the parties are culturally closer. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) normative 
isomorphism hypothesis states that socialization can act as an isomorphic force to make 
organizations similar, and thus culturally closer. On-the-job trainings can erode some of these 
differences between professionals, and trigger homogenization in the organizations they work 
for. Twinning projects are such on-the-job trainings. Yet, as the EU admission process is a 
pressure cooker, it is to be expected that the BCs would like a Twinning partner who has a 
greater understanding of the BC’s organizational structure and culture well as this eases the 
homogenization process. Therefore, BCs are more likely to turn towards MSs experts who are 
structurally and culturally more similar to them, disregarding the quality of governance of that 
country (Rose 1991: 14). Second, the socialization process hinges on quality of interaction 
between professionals (Königová 2003). Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2004: 636) identify 
the lack of country specific trainings prior to the start of the project as obstacles in creating 
good working relationships between the Twinning officials. In all, it demonstrates that 
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philosophy of governance similarity, the similarity between the culture and structure between 
the BC and MS, increases the chances of the realization of externally supported public sector 
reform. This leads to the third hypothesis: (H3) the more similar the philosophy of governance 
of the MS experts to the BC, the more likely externally supported public sector reform will be 
realized. 
 
Chapter conclusion  
This chapter discussed the literature related to the Twinning instrument and (externally 
supported) public sector reform. The review of the Twinning instrument literature showed that 
most scholars have particularly zoomed in on the beneficiary end of the Twinning exercise, 
illuminating the need for research on the role of the expert sending EU Member States. 
Following this observation and the focus of this research, the chapter developed hypotheses 
related to the three variables of interest: the Twinner level, the sector level and the institutional 
level. The next chapter will outline the approach taken to test the hypotheses developed in this 
chapter.    
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Chapter 4: Approach  
The previous chapter zoomed in on the public sector reform literature and identified three 
hypotheses that explain when EU MSs experts are able to realize public sector reforms in 
beneficiary countries of the Twinning instrument. This chapter describes the research 
approach. First, the chapter will explain the choice for a descriptive research design that focuses 
on the Netherlands, and then it will provide a detailed overview of the chosen method: 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Last, the chapter will outline how the dependent and 
independent variables were operationalized.  
 
Design 
This exploratory research employs a descriptive research design focusing on the Netherlands 
as the EU MS Twinning partner. Nineteen Dutch Twinning projects are analyzed, which allows 
for a comparison of different institutional and cultural similarities between the Dutch experts 
and the participating BCs, and their link to public sector reform. Furthermore, this medium-
range N-design allowed for an in-depth investigation of the behavior of the Twinners, which 
large-N studies do not allow for (Blatter and Haverland 2014: 6). By zooming in on a particular 
phenomenon, this study is able to uncover the characteristics and circumstances related to the 
role of the MS experts that lead to externally supported public sector reform (Yin 1994). The 
dependent variable of the analysis is the realization of public sector reform as a result of 
Twinning. The independent variables are the quality of the (Dutch) Twinner, sectoral 
politicization and philosophy of governance similarity.  
 
Case selection: the Netherlands  
This analysis selected the Netherlands as the EU Member State to zoom in on to develop a 
greater understanding of the role of the EU expert sending countries in Twinning projects. The 
Netherlands is a representative case of an EU expert sending MS, and thus appropriate for this 
research, as its Twinning participation ranks as average in comparison to the other EU-15 
Member States since 1998 (DG Near 2016). The Dutch government has a high level of 
government effectiveness (Charron et al. 2010: 107). This indicator captures both the quality 
of the civil service as well as its competence to implement policy. Both the direct and indirect 
institutional environment of the expert sending MS may impact its ability to realize externally 
supported public sector reform in beneficiary countries. As this research is focusing on the 
direct component, the indirect government effectiveness may bias the results. However, given 
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that the Netherlands represents a handbook example of an effective government, this bias is 
not likely to occur. The limitation of this selection is that this research will pertain insights 
predominantly regarding Twinning partners with a relatively high level of government 
effectiveness (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 64).1 
 
The selection of Twinning projects included in the analysis was predominantly guided by data 
access, as the European Union prescribes that Final Twinning reports are only allowed to be 
shared once permission has been given by all parties involved in the Twinning project. 
Furthermore, the Dutch National Contact Point (NCP) was unable to share a list of the contact 
information of Dutch Twinners. Therefore, the NCP asked Twinners, if interested and willing 
to cooperate, to contact the author. Hence, this research was dependent on the willingness of 
the Twinners to be involved in this research project. Despite these circumstances, the projects 
included in this research present an illustrative sample of Dutch Twinning involvement. Six 
out of fourteen Twinning sectors are represented, covering sectors from transport to agriculture 
to justice and home affairs. The sample includes twelve out of twenty-seven BCs where the 
Netherlands has been the leading partner of the Twinning project between 1998 and 2016. This 
focus on Twinning projects where the Netherlands served as a leading partner is chosen 
because the role of the Netherlands as junior partner varies greatly between Twinning projects, 
which brings in too many uncontrollable influences. For a more detailed review of all projects 
for which the Netherlands has been a leading partner, refer to Appendix A. The time frame in 
which the Twinning projects took place ranges from 2003 to 2016. The significance of this 
case selection is illustrated by the strong differences in respect to the independent variables of 
interest (Blatter and Haverland 2014: 25).  
 
Method 
This project uses Ragin’s (2000) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) approach. QCA is a 
set-theoretic method that views relations between phenomena as set relations (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012: 3). These sets are comprised of different combinations of causal conditions 
                                                
1 This research originally set out to investigate two EU-15 Member States scoring on opposite sides of the 
government effectiveness ranking, notably the Netherlands (ranking high) and Italy (ranking the lowest) to 
allow for a most different cross-country comparison (Charron et. al 2010). Despite multiple attempts to gain 
access to the Italian Twinning reports and consultants, the Italian office was uncooperative and the analysis 
had to be limited to one country only.  
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that lead to an outcome (Toshkov 2016). QCA works with membership scores, which indicate 
whether a condition is present or not (1 = full membership, 0 = full non-membership). The 
conditions can be divided into necessary and sufficient conditions. If a (combination of causal) 
condition(s) is necessary for the outcome, then this condition (X) is a superset of the outcome 
(Y). If a (combination of causal) condition(s) is sufficient condition for the outcome, the 
condition (X) is a subset of the outcome (Y) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 139). The 
strength of QCA lies within its ability to account for the complexity that is pertinent to social 
science research. Furthermore, it fills the methodological gap for a cross-case comparison of 
10 to 50 cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 77). As EU externally supported public sector 
reform is influenced by a number of conditions, QCA proves to be the most applicable method 
to unfold these conditions and its potential conjunctures.  
 
The greatest criticism that QCA has received from scholars is related to its original crisp set 
QCA (csQCA), which has a dichotomous operationalization of membership. Considering the 
different degrees to which externally supported public sector reform was realized as a result of 
a Twinning project as well as the multi-value of the independent variables, csQCA is the not 
an appropriate variant of QCA for this analysis, but its technique can be used as a starting point. 
This research predominantly uses fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA), which can account for gradations 
in membership (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 13). Yet, the determination of the point of 
indifference (0.5) is crucial, as the chosen cut-off point can impact the findings presented 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 28; Wagemann and Schneider 2007: 8). Yet, Schneider and 
Wagemann (2012: 26) also argue that minor adjustments to the threshold often do not cause 
great differences in the results.  
 
To perform the fsQCA, the collected data was coded in a raw table, and subsequently 
calibrated. The calibration process allocates the membership scores (0, 0.25, 0.51, 0.75, 1) to 
each variable of each case. The membership of 0.51 is preferred over a membership score of 
0.50 to avoid points of indifference in the analysis. This calibration followed the direct method, 
which determines the threshold for full membership and full non-membership as well as the 
cross-over point based on existing knowledge, rather than a regression analysis (Ragin 2008). 
The fsQCA analysis was run in the software program R. The R-script is attached as Appendix 
E.  
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To determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the realization of externally supported 
public sector reform, an account of each Twinning project was developed, which captures the 
conditions based on the three hypotheses. The account is based on (a) 19 official Final 
Twinning Reports and (b) 11 semi-structured interviews with Dutch officials who took part in 
Twinning. The interview questions are included in Appendix C. All interviews have been 
recorded and the transcripts (in Dutch) are available upon request. The quotes from these 
interviews that are cited in this study have been translated from Dutch to English by the author. 
The name of the interviewees and the organization they work for has been anonymized to 
protect the privacy of the interviewees as much as possible. Interview 1 and 2 were used as 
exploratory interviews to gain a greater understanding of the Twinning instrument. Interview 
3 to 11, with the exception of Interview 7, represent the projects included in the QCA analysis. 
Some of the interviewees were involved in one Twinning project, others in multiple Twinning 
projects.  
 
Operationalization/Data collection 
This project will focus on public sector reform triggered by Twinning projects for which the 
Netherlands has been a leading partner and that have taken place between 2003 and 2016. The 
operationalization of the dependent variable and independent variables is outlined below. The 
allocation of membership for each of the variables is listed in Appendix B.  
 
Dependent variable: public sector reform as a result of a Twinning project  
The first research stage pertained the operationalization of the dependent variable, the outcome 
included in the analysis. The EU measures Twinning success by looking at the achievement of 
the mandatory results of the project (Bouscharain and Moreau 2012). These results are often 
broken down by activity. For each activity a self-assessment is reported in the Final Twinning 
Report (unsatisfactory, satisfactory or very satisfactory). To capture the result of the project as 
a whole, the average score of the achievement of the mandatory results was calculated by 
allocating a 1 for each unsatisfactory activity, a 3 for each satisfactory activity and a 5 for every 
very satisfactory activity, for purposes explained later.  
 
As there can be a political or financial incentive for Twinning parties to report that the 
mandatory results are achieved, the listed achieved mandatory results in the Final Twinning 
Report may fail to capture whether an actual reform took place (Twinning Official 1, interview, 
14 September 2016; Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 2017). Therefore, realization 
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of public sector reform as a result of Twinning is defined as the actual achievement of the 
mandatory results, as verified by the interviews with Twinning experts. The non-realization of 
public sector reform is defined as the non-achievement of the mandatory results (as outlined in 
the Final Twinning Report), as confirmed by an involved Twinning expert. This verification is 
obtained during face-to-face interviews where the Twinners were asked to score the actual 
achievement of the mandatory results – instead of the reported - of the project on a scale from 
1 (very unsatisfactory) to 5 (very satisfactory) and to provide a motivation for their score 
allocation.  
 
The final outcome is illustrated by a membership score range of [0;1] based on a 5-point Likert 
scale (0; 0.25;0.51; 0.75; 1). This score is calculated based on the findings obtained from the 
Final Twinning Reports (50%) and the score given by the Dutch Twinning expert (50%). In 
case of final score between two scores on the Likert-scale, the score is rounded off in the 
direction of the score allocated by the Twinning expert. For example, if the report received a 
3, and the Twinning expert allocated a 2, the final score would be 2,5, rounded off as 2 on the 
Likert scale (and consequently receiving a membership score of 0.25).  
 
Independent variables 
The number of independent variables included in a QCA analysis should be kept at a maximum 
of four independent variables to avoid dysfunctionality (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 276). 
Therefore, the selection of independent variables was limited to three variables: the quality of 
Twinner, sectoral politicization and philosophy of government similarity.  
 
(1) Quality of (Dutch) Twinner  
Given the limited number of QCA variables, the overall quality of the Twinner is included in 
the analysis without making a distinction between leadership and teacher qualities. Therefore, 
this variable only captures the extent to which the quality of the (Dutch) Twinner matters to 
the realization of external supported public sector reform. Nevertheless, if found that the 
Twinner is a sufficient and/or necessary condition for the outcome, a more in-depth discussion 
of hypothesis 1a and 1b is included in the analysis, i.e. whether leadership and/or teacher 
qualities have been important or not in the identified relevant cases.  
 
To measure the quality of the (Dutch) Twinners involved related to the first hypotheses, both 
the Final Twinning Reports as well as the face-to-face interviews are used. Final Twinning 
 
	
24 
Reports are used to note any indicators of the teaching and leadership qualities of the Twinners 
as pointed out in the hypotheses, namely: a good command of English, previous Twinning 
experiences, leadership qualities, country/region specific background, and being expert within 
the field in which the Twinning project takes place. The quality score of the Twinners is 
assumed to be average (2.5) on a 5-point Likert scale. If any of the five qualities listed is 
positively mentioned in the Final Report, the score for that specific quality is increased from 
0.5 to 1. In the case a negative mention is made of a quality, it reduced the score for that specific 
quality from 0.5 to 0.  
 
During the interview, Twinners were asked to elaborate on the role and qualities of the 
Twinners involved, namely the RTA, PL and experts. Subsequently, they were asked if the 
person who fulfilled this role mattered for the outcome of the project, i.e. why and what 
qualities make up the ‘perfect’ person for the job. After, they were asked to rank their own 
overall qualification for the specific Twinning project based on the earlier mentioned five 
qualities, on a scale from 1 (not qualified) to 5 (very qualified), and provide a motivation for 
their score allocation. Finally, they were asked to elaborate on the overall qualification for the 
specific Twinning project of the Dutch Twinners involved, again on a scale from 1 (not 
qualified) to 5 (very qualified) and provide reasons for this score.   
 
The Final Report scores were combined with the interview scores to retrieve a final quality of 
(Dutch) Twinner score. This variable is illustrated by a membership score range of [0;1] based 
on a 5-point Likert scale (0; 0.25; 0.51; 0.75; 1). This score is calculated based on the final 
report score (50%), and the two scores allocated by the interviewee (both 25%.) In case of final 
score between two scores on the Likert-scale (3.5 or 4.5), the score is rounded off in the 
direction of the score allocated to the overall qualification of the Dutch Twinners involved in 
the Twinning Project by the Twinning expert. In the case of a 3.25, it was rounded off to 3.  
 
(2) Sectoral politicization 
The project number of each Twinning project is made up of a code, which includes the code 
number referring to the sector to which the project belongs, as shown in the Appendix A. These 
codes were used to allocate the sector to which the project belongs. These sectors were 
subsequently categorized as politicized (1) or non-politicized (0), based on the categorization 
shown in Table 1. In case a Twinning project belonged to the category “other”, it was allocated 
to the sector to which it most closely corresponds to. 
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As the distinction between politicized and non-politicized sector is in reality more nuanced, 
this allocation was complemented by the face-to-face interview where Twinners were asked 
about the politicization of the sector, such as the number of stake holders involved in the 
project. This procedure was followed as the degree of politicization of the sector might vary 
between segments within a sector itself. Subsequently, the Twinners were asked to rank the 
sector politicization on a 5-point Likert scale, 1 (not politicized at all) to 5 (very politicized).  
 
The final score for sector politicization is illustrated by a membership score range of [0;1] 
based on a 5-point Likert scale (0; 0.25; 0.51; 0.75; 1). This score is predominantly based on 
the score allocated by the interviewee. In the case where the interviewee allocated a 4 or 5 
score to a project that took place in a sector that was identified as non-politicized, the score 
was deducted by one point on the 5-point Likert scale. If the interviewee allocated a 1 or 2 
score to a project taking place in a politicized sector, the score was increased by one point on 
the 5-point Likert scale. 
 
(3) Philosophy of governance similarity  
To measure the similarity between the philosophy of governance between the Dutch experts 
and the beneficiary country in which the project took place, only the interviews were used. 
During the face-to-face interviews, Twinners were first asked to provide details about the 
institutional structure of the organization as well as the country in which the project took place. 
Then, they were asked to rank the philosophy of governance similarity between the Netherlands 
and the country in which they conducted the project on a scale from 1 (very different) to 5 
(very similar). This score was subsequently translated to a membership score range of [0;1] 
Politicized Non-politicized 
Agriculture and fisheries Environment 
Energy Education 
Justice and Home Affairs Finance, Internal market and 
economic criteria 
Nuclear safety Health and consumer 
protection 
Social sector projects Standardization and 
certification   
Transport Statistics 
 Structural funds 
 Telecommunications 
Table 1. Twinning projects per sector  
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based on the 5-point Likert scale (0; 0.25; 0.51; 0.75; 1). As philosophy of governance 
similarity may have changed over time, and can even vary depending on the organization, no 
static measure is included to capture philosophy of governance in addition to the interview 
responses.  
 
Chapter conclusion  
The operationalization of the dependent variable and independent variables are at the center of 
this research. In all, this chapter outlined the research approach that is used in this study. It 
provides the foundation upon which the results are built, which are presented in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
 
The previous chapter outlined the chosen approach to examine the conditions when 
EU Member States experts are able to realize public sector reforms in beneficiary 
countries of the Twinning instrument. This chapter presents the results based on the 
QCA and proceeds with an interpretation of these findings. The results section is 
structured as follows. First, the presence (and absence) of necessary conditions is 
examined by building on the strengths of both csQCA and fsQCA. The csQCA 
examines the necessary conditions by means of two-by-two tables, upon which the 
fsQCA can build by examining the presence of the csQCA identified necessary 
conditions through an XY-plot and a consistency score. Then, the presence of the 
sufficient conditions is researched, following a two-step procedure. The first step 
pertains the identification of the relevant causal combinations, i.e. reducing the 
number of combinations to be examined. The second step involves a logical 
maximization process that leads to the determination of the sufficient conditions 
from three different dimensions, namely the (1) conservative solution, (2) 
parsimonious solution and (3) intermediate solution. Finally, the hypotheses will be 
rejected or not, based on the examination of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
After the results are presented, they will be used to test the hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Necessary conditions 
A necessary condition is a condition that needs to be in place for the outcome to take place. In 
other words, the outcome does not take place without the necessary condition. To determine 
which conditions are necessary, two-by-two tables were created to contrast the outcome with 
the three variables of interest, namely the quality of the Twinner, sector politicization, and 
philosophy of governance similarity (Table 2). The two-by-two tables are created by 
approaching the observations as a QCA binary crisp set (csQCA), allocating a 0 for all 
memberships scores of the variables below 0.5, and a 1 for all the membership scores of the 
variables above 0.5. This approach was chosen as it allows for a clear-cut overview of the 
relationship between the outcome (Y) and the independent variables. 
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Table 2. Two-by-two tables, necessary conditions 
 
The tables reveal that the data set does not include any cases where the outcome (Y) = 0. These 
empirically non-observed cases are coined as logical remainders. For now, it suffices to say 
that this observation challenges the validity of the findings, but does not invalidate them. 
Furthermore, the tables show that in the case of the first variable (X1), the quality of the 
Twinner, no instances can be identified where the outcome took place without the variable 
present. This seems to demonstrate that this variable is a necessary condition. When it comes 
to the sector and philosophy variables, Table 2 clearly shows that there are a number of cases 
where the outcome (Y) is present without sector politicization (X2) or philosophy of 
governance similarity (X3) present. This observation indicates that these two conditions are 
not consistent necessary conditions for the outcome.  
 
To verify if the quality of the Twinner is indeed a necessary condition, the fsQCA approach 
was used, as it can account for the fine-grained information included in the dataset. 
Additionally, fsQCA has a more thorough approach to calculate the consistency score of an 
observation. More specifically, it looks at to which degree the membership of a case in of the 
independent variable of interest is “equal to or greater than their membership in [the outcome]” 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 141). As fsQCA includes the differences between the cases, 
which are grouped together by csQCA, the fsQCA findings are more accurate.  
 
In general, the more cases where the outcome (Y) has a greater membership than the variable 
of interest (X), the lower the consistency value for this condition, and the less likely this 
condition can be coined as a necessary condition. To determine if the quality of the Twinning 
variable is indeed a necessary condition, a XY-plot was created to examine the cases where Y 
> X1. Figure 4 demonstrates that almost all cases that fall on or above the diagonal. This shows 
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that there is a higher membership in the outcome (Y) than the quality of the Twinner variable 
(X1), meaning that the quality of the Twinner variable is most likely a necessary condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To verify this observation, the consistency value of the quality of the Twinner was calculated 
according to the following formula by Ragin (2006) (as cited by Schneider and Wagemann 
2012: 141): 
 
 
The consistency value is “the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or 
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin 2006: 292). 
The application of the formula on the quality of the Twinner variable gave a consistency value 
of 0.7. Scholars have argued that the acceptable threshold for consistency should be at 0.9 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 143). Therefore, the consistency value refutes the initial 
observation of the two-by-two tables and XY-plot that the quality of the Twinner is a necessary 
condition. In all, none of the variables included in this analysis are found to be a necessary 
condition.  
 
Sufficient conditions  
The analysis will now turn to an analysis of the sufficient conditions following a two-step 
procedure. First, the relevant causal combinations are identified and then a logical 
maximization process leads to the determination of the sufficient conditions. To derive the 
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relevant causal combinations for the outcome, the analysis will now zoom in on the analysis of 
fuzzy subsets. If a combination of causal conditions leads in all cases to the same outcome, this 
combination can be labeled as a sufficient set of conditions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 99). 
Based on the three conditions included in this analysis, eight (23) corners to the vector space  
formed by causal conditions are formulated. Table 3 shows the membership of the case that 
was calculated for each of the combinations. The T stands for the quality of the Twinner, the 
S stands for Sector politicization and the P stands for the Philosophy of governance similarity. 
The ~-sign indicates the absence of the variable. When a membership score is above 0.5 (in 
bold), one can say that this case belongs to this combination of causal conditions. To illustrate, 
case 1 belongs in the corner of the vector space T * S * ~P, as the minimum of its memberships 
in the quality of the Twinner (T = 0.75), the sector politicization (S = 0.75) and no philosophy 
of governance similarity (~P = 0.75) is 0.75. 
 
 
 
Case Membership in causal 
conditions 
Membership in corners of vector space formed by causal conditions 
T S P ~T * ~S 
* ~P 
T * ~S 
* ~P 
~T * S 
* ~P 
~T * ~S 
* P 
T * S * 
~P 
T * ~S 
* P 
~T * S 
* P 
T * S * 
P 
1 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2 0.51 0.51 0.25 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.25 
3 0.75 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.25 
4 0.75 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.25 
5 0.75 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.25 
6 0.75 0.51 0 0.25 0.49 0.25 0 0.51 0 0 0 
7 0.75 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.25 
8 0.51 0.51 0.25 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.25 
9 0.51 0.375 0.375 0.49 0.51 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 
10 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.25 
11 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.25 
12 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.25 
13 0.51 0.75 0.375 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.375 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.375 
14 0.51 0 0.875 0.125 0.125 0 0.49 0 0.51 0 0 
15 0.51 0.25 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.25 
16 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.375 0.25 0.25 
17 0.51 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.75 
18 0.51 0.75 0.51 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.49 0.51 
19 0.51 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Table 3. Fuzzy-set membership of cases in causal combinations  
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Following this step, the cases are grouped together by their corresponding vector space corner. 
Some corners of the vector space have a high number of cases with strong membership, while 
others do not have any cases with strong membership, as illustrated by Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of cases across causal combinations 
 
The second, third and fourth column of Table 4 represent the three variables included in the 
analysis. The fifth column shows the corresponding vector space corner based on the three 
columns. To demonstrate, the row 2 of Table 4 thus shows that the causal argument of T * ~S 
* ~P is a subset to the realization of public sector reform (Y). If the outcome is 1, this means 
that the causal argument holds. The first, third, fourth and seventh row do not have any 
corresponding cases to the causal combination described. These rows are labeled as logical 
remainders.  
 
Relevant Causal Combinations 
 
To determine which combinations are considered relevant causal combinations, one needs to 
look at the number-of-cases threshold. As the number of cases included in this analysis is 
relatively small and in-depth knowledge has been acquired for each case, the threshold can be 
put at a minimum of 1 case with a membership above 0.5 for the case to be included in the 
causal combination (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 107). Table 4 shows a clear distinction between 
the consistent causal combinations (row 2, 5, 6 and 8) and the inconsistent causal combinations 
Row 
number 
Quality of 
Twinner 
(T) 
Sector 
politicization 
(S) 
Philosophy 
of 
governance 
similarity (P) 
Corresponding 
Vector Space 
Corner 
N of cases 
with 
membership 
in causal 
combination  
> 0.5 
Consistency 
(N = 19) Outcome 
1 0 0 0 ~T * ~ S * ~P 0 
(too few cases 
with scores  
> 0.5) 
remainder 
2 1 0 0 T * ~S * ~P 5 1 1 
3 0 1 0 ~T * S * ~P 0 
(too few cases 
with scores  
> 0.5) 
remainder 
4 0 0 1 ~T * ~S * P 0 
(too few cases 
with scores  
> 0.5) 
remainder 
5 1 1 0 T * S * ~P 9 1 1 
6 1 0 1 T * ~S * P 3 0.97 1 
7 0 1 1 ~T * S * P 0 
(too few cases 
with scores  
> 0.5) 
remainder 
8 1 1 1 T * S * P 2 1 1 
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(row 1, 3, 4 and 7). Yet, Table 4 has been comprised based on binary crisp-set values. A fuzzy 
subset relation only exists when the membership scores in a causal combination are less or 
equal to the outcome, Xi £ Y (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 102). To examine if this is the case, for 
each of the combinations a XY-plot has been created, as shown by Figure 5.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. XY-plots of Degree of Membership in Outcome (realization of public sector 
reform) against (1) Degree of Membership in T * ~S * ~P, (2) Degree of Membership in T * 
S * ~P,  (3) Degree of Membership in T * ~S * P and (4) Degree of Membership in T * S * P. 
 
As the four plots of Figure 5 demonstrate, almost all memberships scores of the four causal 
combinations of conditions are consistently smaller or equal to the outcome. The only 
exception is one case in the (2) plot, which shows to be inconsistent with the fuzzy subset 
relation. As this only pertains one case, the observation can be neglected. In all, the XY-plots 
confirm the argument that the four combinations of causal conditions can be considered to be 
relevant combinations of causal conditions. 
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To verify the observations from the XY-plot, their consistency score was calculated according 
to the following formula (as cited by Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 126): 
 
 
 
 
The second last column of Table 4 lists the consistency scores of the four combinations of 
causal conditions. This consistency score evaluates to what extent the causal combination is a 
member of the outcome. All scores range between 0.97 and 1, which indicates almost perfect 
consistency across the combinations of causal conditions. If the consistency is ranked above 
0.9, the outcome is coded as consistent (1), as the last column of Table 4 shows. Subsequently, 
the table is minimized omitting logical remainders:  
 
Twinner * ~Sector       Twinner * Sector      Twinner * ~Sector      Twinner * Sector        Realization 
* ~Philosophy          +   * ~Philosophy     +  * Philosophy          +   * Philosophy        à   Public 
Sector           Reform (Y) 
              
Cases with strong membership in the first combination: 9, 10, 11, 12, 16 
Cases with strong membership in the second combination: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 19 
Cases with strong membership in the third combination: 4, 14, 15 
Cases with strong membership in the fourth combination: 17, 18  
 
Logical Minimization and Remainders  
The goal of the QCA-approach is derive a least complex logical truth. To obtain this, the 
principle of logical minimization is pursued: if two rows of the minimized truth table 
demonstrating relevant combinations of causal conditions are different on the basis of one 
condition (i.e. ~S and S), this condition can be considered redundant as the outcome can take 
place if the condition is present (S) or not (~S) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 105). There 
are three dimensions on which the logical remainders can be classified in the logical 
minimization process: (1) conservative solution, (2) parsimonious solution and (3) intermediate 
solution. The conservative solution does not make any assumption regarding the logical 
remainders. The parsimonious solution makes assumptions about counterfactuals and includes 
them into the solution. The intermediate solution only includes counterfactuals that can be 
substantiated by existing knowledge.  
 
	
34 
 
(1) Conservative Solution  
The following Boolean expression captures all four combinations of causal conditions that are 
sufficient for the outcome without making any assumptions about the logical remainders: 
row 2   + row 5  + row 6  + row 8  
T~S~P  + TS~P + T~SP  + TSP   à Y  
 
Row 2 (T~S~P) and row 5 (TS~P) are different on the basis of one condition: the sector (S) 
condition is absent in row 2, but present in row 5. Based on the rules of logical minimization, 
the expression can be rewritten as: 
row 2 and row 5 +  row 6  +  row 8  
T~P    +  T~SP  +  TSP   à Y  
 
Similarly, row 6 and row 8 only differ on that same condition: the sector (S) condition is absent 
in row 6, but present in row 8. Thus, the sufficiency expression can be further minimized to: 
row 2 and row 5 +  row 6  and row 8  
T~P    +  TP    à Y  
 
The conjunctions of T~P and TP both lead to Y. The only difference between these 
conjunctions is the absence or presence of condition P. This leads to a final minimization of 
the Boolean expression to: T à Y. The conservative solution can thus be summarized as: 
T à Y. 
 
Cases with strong membership in this combination: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 18, 19 
 
(2) Parsimonious Solution  
The parsimonious solution makes assumptions about logical remainders. Row 1, 3, 4 and 7 
have an unknown outcome and are therefore coded under the conservative solution as 0. To 
derive a parsimonious solution, for all rows with logical remainders a counterfactual analysis 
is conducted. 
 
Row 1 (~T + ~S + ~P) seems to be an unlikely scenario to lead to a positive outcome. A non-
politicized sector seems to be an insufficient condition to lead to public sector reform. 
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Moreover, low quality Twinners in addition to large philosophy of governance dissimilarity do 
not seem to contribute to the achievement of the outcome. Therefore, row 1 will be assumed to 
be ~T + ~S + ~P à 0.  Row 3 (~T + S + ~P) seems to be an even more unlikely scenario in 
comparison to Row 1, as public sector reform is more likely to be realized in a non-politicized 
sector. Therefore, row 3 will be assumed to be ~T + S + ~P à 0. Row 4 (~T + ~S + P) seems 
to be a potentially more plausible scenario, as a non-politicized sector as well as philosophy of 
governance similarity can have a positive effect on the realization of public sector reform. 
Therefore, Row 4 will be assumed to be ~T + ~S + P à 1. Finally, Row 7 (~T + S + P) also 
seems to be an unlikely scenario to lead to the outcome. While the similarity in philosophy of 
governance can lead to an increased likelihood of the realization of public sector reform, a 
politicized sector in addition to low quality Twinners seem to make this reform less likely. 
Therefore, this case scenario cannot be substantiated with counterfactual analysis. Based on 
this counterfactual analysis, one additional combination of causal conditions can be added to 
the four combinations of causal conditions included in the conservative solution: 
row 2   + row 4 + row 5  + row 6  + row 8  
T~S~P  + ~T~SP + TS~P + T~SP  + TSP   à Y  
 
Based on the logical minimization technique, this expression is minimized to: 
T + ~SP à Y. 
 
(3) Intermediate Solution  
The intermediate solution only takes into account the counterfactuals that can be embedded 
within the existing knowledge. The counterfactuals included in the parsimonious solution are 
so-called “easy” counterfactuals, meaning that they are embedded in theoretical and 
substantive knowledge and subsequently will be preserved in the intermediate solution. This 
more stringent application leads to no alteration to the combinations included in the 
parsimonious solution. Therefore, the final intermediate solution can be expressed identically 
to the parsimonious solution:  
T + ~SP à Y. 
 
The intermediate solution is always superior to the conservative and the parsimonious solution, 
and will thus be seen as the final solution of the combination of causal conditions that is 
sufficient for the outcome. The corresponding consistency value (1) and its raw coverage 
(0.369) confirm that the expression is the least complex logical truth to explain the combination 
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of causal conditions that lead to the realization of public sector reform under the Twinning 
instrument.  
 
Interpretation  
The results have illustrated that the most fitting combination of causal conditions explaining 
the role of the EU MS experts in the realization of externally supported public sector reforms 
is T + ~SP à Y. This section will interpret these findings variable by variable and connect 
them to the hypotheses articulated in Chapter 3. First, the outcome variable (Y) will be 
discussed, followed by a discussion of the combinations of causal conditions, notably T and 
~SP. Furthermore, the results will be linked to the statements made by the interviewees, 
comments from the Final Report and the literature on both the Twinning instrument and public 
sector reform. Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations of the findings.  
 
Y: The path leading to the realization of externally supported public sector reform  
The first variable to be discussed is the outcome variable: the realization of externally 
supported public sector reform. As Table 1 illustrated, this study did not include any Twinning 
projects that could be labeled unsatisfactory. In fact, according to Twinning Official 11 
(interview, 9 February 2017) “Twinning projects are always satisfactory.” This is a “requisite 
of Twinning” (Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 January 2017). Twinning Official 3 
(interview, 13 January 2017) acknowledged that “there are some projects where you know it is 
garbage, but you did what needed to happen, but it is not an ace.” Officials explain these 
observations by stating that changes are made half-way through the project if it is clear that the 
result are unreachable (Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 January 2017; Twinning Official 11, 
interview, 9 February 2017) or the reporting on the activities that are carried out is a positively 
exaggerated (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 September 2016). Furthermore, the BC “is 
always very satisfied about the progress made” (Twinning Official 4, interview, 16 January 
2017), which influences the reporting process as the Final Report is written by both the PLMS 
and PLBC. According to Twinning Official 11 (interview, 9 February 2017), there is an agenda 
behind this positive reporting: the EU delegation wants the project to succeed, the MS wants 
to continue doing future Twinning Projects and the BC does not want to lose face. According 
to this same official, the achievement of the mandatory results is a “political event”.  
 
Within the studied sample, there were two instances where the report (2) or the interviewee 
(2.5) labeled the project as unsatisfactory. The related score of the interview (3) or the report 
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(5) scored the Twinning project as satisfactory, which led to an overall satisfactory score for 
both Twinning projects.  
 
The ‘always’ attainment of mandatory results makes analyzing the role of EU MSs experts in 
the realization of externally supported public sector reforms more difficult. Nonetheless, the 
experts emphasized that there are clear differences between “a gem of a project” (Twinning 
Official 9, interview, 25 January 2017) and “it was satisfactory, but nothing more than that” 
(Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 2017). Thus, while projects may be satisfactory 
and reach the mandatory results, the degree to which these results are achieved differs greatly 
(Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 January 2017). These differences have helped to identify 
the best combination of causal conditions explaining the role of the EU MSs experts in the 
realization of externally supported public sector reforms as T + ~SP à Y. Now, the analysis 
will turn to an explanation of how these two conditions contribute to the attainment of the 
setout goals.   
 
T: The good quality Twinner  
Both the conservative and the intermediate solution indicate that the quality of the Twinner is 
a sufficient condition for the outcome. This means that a good quality Twinner is a sufficient 
condition for the realization of externally supported public sector reform. It shows that it 
matters who is selected for the job of RTA, PL or even expert. The QCA only distinguished 
between not qualified Twinners and highly qualified Twinners. Therefore, the results only 
show that the condition of a qualified Twinner matters, which is enough to refute null 
hypothesis H1c: the likelihood of the realization of externally supported public sector reform 
is not dependent on the qualities and behavior of the Twinner. But then what constitutes a 
qualified Twinner? Hypothesis 1a and 1b distinguished between a teacher who provides 
support and guidance to the BC’s officials and a leader who provides direction to the BC’s 
officials and MSs’ experts. The triangulation of the interview data with the Final Twinning 
Reports illustrate that for both hypothesis evidence can be found, depending on the role of the 
Twinner during the project.  
 
For the Final Reports, the qualified Twinner variable was operationalized by looking at 
references to the following five qualities in the Report: a good command of English, previous 
Twinning experiences, leadership qualities, country/region specific background, and being 
knowledge expert within the field in which the Twinning project takes place. 8 reports included 
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a positive mention of the knowledge experts carried, (eg. “esteemed experts” (Vos and Tyková 
2008: 17), “a skilled team” (Kuipers and Glavač 2007: 21), “sufficient knowledge of foreign 
languages and up-to-date technical knowledge” (Jansen, Tulen and Šprlje 2014: 22-23)), 2 
reports, which were 2 follow-up Twinning projects, referred to previous Twinning experiences 
by those involved in the project (Kuipers and Verbič 2009; Kuipers and Verbič 2010), and one 
report positively commented on the managerial skills of the RTA (Hunink and van den 
Muyzenberg 2012). On the other hand, 2 reports referred negatively to the lack of country 
specific knowledge (Tall and Vos 2010; Anon. 2015) and one report commented on the lack 
of IT knowledge by the experts (Stunt and Elisei 2006). In a preliminary interpretation, it seems 
that H1a links to the experts involved in the Twinning project, while H1b links to the RTA.  
 
When asking the interviewees about what constitutes a good Twinner, it became clear that most 
qualities are never included in the Twinning Report. However, the general gist was that the 
Twinner job requires specific qualities and that not everyone is fit for the Twinning job, as 
stated by Twinning Official 11 (interview, 9 February 2017): “you can’t pull just anyone from 
their desk and say go to Turkey.” Twinning Official 2 (interview, 9 October 2016) added, “a 
good lawyer isn’t automatically a good RTA.” Based on the Final Reports and the interviews, 
Twinners are subdivided into the leaders, notably the RTA, PL and CL, and the teachers, 
notably the experts. The list of good qualities mentioned by the interviewees varies greatly 
between them and are therefore presented separately.  
 
The Leader: The RTA, PL & CL  
The good qualities for the Twinners serving in leadership roles seem to focus more on being a 
good organizer (Twinning Official 9, interview, 25 January 2017) and someone with an 
extensive network, rather than a good expert. According to Twinning Official 5 (interview, 18 
January 2017), leadership roles require extensive experience within the organization to 
understand all the players involved in the organization and to understand who to get for which 
job. Most experts are recruited via the network of the organization, and therefore it is useful if 
the leadership brings along such a network (Twinning Official 9, interview, 25 January 2017).  
 
The interviewees disagreed on the required technical knowledge a Resident Twinning Advisor 
should have. If a Twinning is very technical, an RTA with expert knowledge could be very 
useful (Twinning Official 2, interview, 19 October 2016). Also, the BC often desires an RTA 
who has in-depth knowledge on the subject matter (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 
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September 2016). But, the additional requirements that accompany the job description of the 
RTA, such as being willing to move to another country for 2-3 years, leads to short list of 
suitable candidates (ibid). Therefore, some organizations believe that the RTA does not 
necessarily need to be a senior official, but rather a good manager (Twinning Official 2, 
interview, 19 October 2016). Twinning Official 4 (interview, 16 January 2017) stated that 
Dutch RTA’s are much more involved in comparison to their MSs’ colleagues, and do not 
follow a check-list but rather question how they can truly obtain the best results. This non-
checklist attitude caused a Dutch expert team to be called in to replace a Swedish Twinning 
team that did not meet the expectations (ibid). This attitude, according to the official, leads to 
being asked again for other Twinning projects.   
 
A good Project Leader (PL) needs to stick to the protocols and support the RTA (Twinning 
Official 9, interview, 25 January 2017). As a good practice, Twinning Official 4 stated that the 
PL needs to fulfill a connecting role, stating that regular meetings with the entire team to keep 
everyone informed on the progress is very important (interview, 16 January 2017). To win the 
project, some organizations select a PL that has stature: a high official within the organization 
with solid English skills, rigid performance and extensive list of experience (Twinning Official 
5, interview, 18 January 2017).   
 
Component leaders on the other hand, are often chosen based on their background related to 
the component, in addition to their leadership skills. Yet, in certain situations the background 
requirement is not always up-held. As Twinning Official 1 (interview, 14 September 2017), 
who is usually responsible for capacity building, stated, “when someone else had to be 
responsible for the legislation component, I took up that responsibility, while I am not a 
lawyer”. This trend of Twinners taking up responsibilities which they are not qualified for was 
also mentioned by other officials, like Twinning Official 3, who was writing some articles for 
a new law while not having any law-background.  
 
Overall, knowledge of the local BC’s language is not seen as an advantage. While it can 
jumpstart a good working relationship, it may lead to overhearing information that is not 
intended to be shared with the MS(s) (Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 January 2017). 
Furthermore, due to domestic political tensions, the selection of an RTA, PL or expert with 
ethnic background of the BC could lead to heightened tensions if this person is from the 
“wrong” side.  
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In short, the RTA, PL and CL can be seen as fulfilling the leader role, which plays an important 
role in realizing externally supported public sector reform. The list of essential qualities of the 
leader are not limited to good organization skills, an extensive professional network and good 
command of English. In order to realize externally supported public sector reform, the PL needs 
to play the role of a connector and that the CL needs to have extensive knowledge of the 
component he or she is responsible for.  
 
The Teacher: the experts 
When looking at the good qualities of the experts, it is clear that the most important quality for 
a good expert is that they have extensive knowledge about the focus area of the Twinning 
project. As illustrated by Twinning Official 9 (interview, 25 January 2017), “we are – I think - 
the best in Europe. Nowhere is there such a large group of experts who occupy themselves with 
all the components of this, we have experts for everything and we flew them all in for the 
project”. The prestige of the experts ensured that the BC wanted to learn. For the knowledge 
transfer, some interviewees state that an expert’s level of English should be up to par (Twinning 
Official 4, interview, 16 January 2017; Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 January 2017; 
Twinning Official 10, interview, 25 January 2017; Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 
2017) and that they need to have good presentation skills. Furthermore, officials emphasized 
the importance of being able to be (culturally) empathetic (Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 
January 2017; Twinning Official 7, interview, 19 January 2017; Twinning Official 10, 
interview, 25 January 2017). As an example, “when aiming to transfer knowledge, experts need 
to be aware that they often need a translator, which leads to only being able to cover half of the 
stuff they planned as everything needs to be repeated twice” (Twinning Official 9, interview, 
25 January 2017). Therefore, familiarity with the BC’s culture is considered a quality of a good 
Twinner. Often the RTA has already “paved the way” for the experts, and their sole task upon 
arrival is to carry over the knowledge for which he or she has been hired (Twinning Official 9, 
interview, 25 January 2017).   
 
Each organization goes differently about the selection process for the Twinners. Some 
organizations require to have seen the expert at work (Twinning Official 4, interview, 16 
January 2017), others solely skim CVs (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 September 2017), 
other organizations require an English language test (Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 
January 2017) and others invite the expert over for a ‘job interview’ (Twinning Official 8, 
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interview, 20 January 2017). Some organizations hire from within, others, often for capacity 
reasons, look within their network to find a ‘qualified’ person (Twinning Official 2, interview, 
9 October 2016). To improve the quality of the Twinners, one official suggested that Twinners 
should follow a project cycle management course in addition to a report writing course 
(Twinning Official 2, interview, 9 October 2016). If organizations are not confident that they 
have the right person, one organization stated that they do not send them away or have them 
being accompanied by another Twinning expert (Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 
2017). Another organization stressed that they do not even respond to a BC fiche if they are 
unable to find enough qualified Twinners for the Twinning project (Twinning Official 5, 
interview, 18 January 2017). Yet, ‘bad’ hires do occur (Twinning Official 6, interview, 18 
January 2017). A way to partially mitigate this problem is to require all experts to have, in 
addition to their expert knowledge, international experience, a good command of English, solid 
presentation skills and cultural empathy.  
 
In all, it can be concluded that both H1a and H1b are confirmed. Due to the various roles within 
the Twinning project, it is desired that the RTA, PL and CL have leadership qualities that 
provide direction to the BC’s officials and MSs’ experts, while for the expert it is desired that 
he/she has teacher qualities who is able to provide guidance and support to the BC’s officials. 
Thus, externally supported public sector reform is more likely to be realized when (H1a) the 
experts behave like teachers who provides support and guidance to the BC’s officials and 
(H1b) when the RTA, PL and CL behaves like leaders who provides direction to the BC’s 
officials and MSs’ experts. 
 
~SP: the non-politicized sector AND philosophy of governance similarity  
The second combination of causal conditions that is sufficient for the realization of externally 
supported public sector reform is the presence of a non-politicized sector in combination with 
similarity of governance philosophy between the expert sending MS and the beneficiary 
country. In contrast to the Twinning variable, these variables on their own are not sufficient 
conditions. The interpretation will cover the variables separately first, before combining them 
into the second condition.  
 
~S: The non-politicized sector  
As Twinning Official 6 (interview, 18 January 2017) stated, “the technical-focused projects 
were easier than the policy-focused projects that aimed to change the organizational structure.” 
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The latter was much more sensitive as it pertained people and positions (ibid). A sector can be 
experienced as sensitive when “additional regulations may take away some form of income of 
people.” (Twinning Official 10, interview, 25 January 2017; Twinning Official 11, interview, 
9 February 2017). If it is not within the direct interest of the people, it makes the project more 
difficult. In particular, if financial rewards of the project are substantially high, the project 
becomes politically more sensitive as many parties want to be involved in the decision making 
process (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 September 2016; Twinning Official 10, 25 January 
2017). As Bozeman and Pandey (2003: 5) have suggested, a higher number of actors leads to 
increased chances of disagreement. The experiences of the Twinners confirm this conception, 
and state that this disagreement posed challenges to attain the goals set. As illustrated by 
Twinning Official 1, the number of players involved led in the end to the submission of 3 
different drafts on how to proceed, each draft submitted by a different interest party (interview, 
14 September 2016). Another example is that the lower level employees were unable to make 
any further decisions, as decisions were only made at the ministerial and the director level, 
which stagnated the process (Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 2017).  
 
Some officials challenged the notion whether the sector matters. To illustrate, Twinning 
Official 8 (interview, 20 January 2017) was involved with a project that spread across various 
ministries, where he detected no difference between these ministries in terms of resistance. As 
Twinning Official 2 (interview, 9 October 2016) explains, if it pertains a really technical 
acquis, you are still dealing with people, which is more influential than the sector in which the 
project takes place. While these observations are valid, they form the minority.  
 
Other Twinning officials emphasized that they did not involve themselves with politicized 
projects within their sector. “We solely focus on the content, and stay away from the political 
level. We therefore focus our collaboration on the technical level, because that is safe” 
(Twinning Official 5, interview, 18 January 2017). As echoed by Twinning Official 7: “we 
only send experts with technical knowledge. All we do is [the] sending, sending, sending” of 
information (interview, 19 January 2017).  
 
Triangulating these observations with the Final Twinning Reports, similar remarks can be 
made. While the majority of Final Twinning Reports do not make any mention of the sector 
and the challenges or benefits related to the sector, 7 of the 19 analyzed Twinning Reports did. 
The references range from the project is a “sensitive dossier as such each decision related to 
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the topic area requires a clear majority support from both the Government and Parliament” 
(Hunink and van den Muyzenberg 2007: 15), to a “greater commitment from [one of the 
organizations involved], would certainly have helped to achieve better results" (Hunink and 
van den Muyzenberg 2012: 114), to “the project is a complicated project with five 
organizations outside the government being the principal beneficiaries, and the requirement to 
organize complex regional meetings” (Kuipers and Verbič 2009: 6). In all, they confirm the 
statements made by the interviewees that a politicized sector made achieving the set out goals 
by the Twinning Project more difficult.  
 
In the end, both the Final Twinning Reports as the interviewees confirm Hypothesis 2, the less 
politicized the sector of the Twinning project is, the more likely externally supported public 
sector reform will be realized. This condition is not sufficient if not in combination with the 
presence of philosophy of governance similarity. 
 
P: Philosophy of governance similarity 
All interviewees agree on the notion that the philosophy of governance between the 
Netherlands and the countries were they participated in Twinning Project is not identical. These 
differences are often influenced by the geographical location of the country as well as the 
history of the beneficiary country. The findings illustrate that the greater the geographical 
distance, the greater the cultural and structural differences.  
 
The public administration in the BC is often “much more hierarchical” in comparison to the 
Netherlands (Twinning Official 4, interview, 16 January 2017; Twinning Official 6, interview, 
18 January 2017; Twinning Official 9, interview, 25 January 2017). The ministries kept 
distance to one another, while the Netherlands has a strong culture of collaboration (Twinning 
Official 10, interview, 25 January 2017). One official referred to the role communism has 
played in shaping the governance culture in countries like Romania and Bulgaria (Twinning 
Official 10, interview, 25 January 2017). Furthermore, the line of responsibility was very 
different in comparison to the Netherlands: “it is unimaginable that every decision needs to be 
put forward to the [minister]”, while this is the case in the BC (Twinning Official 5, interview, 
18 January 2017). These at times “fundamental” differences between a MS and a BC made the 
accomplishment of the project difficult and were the main source of why certain components 
were not fully achieved (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 September 2016). This is line with 
Rose’s (1991) lesson-drawing theory who believed that lesson-drawing on a public 
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administration level is easier when the parties are culturally closer. One organization has found 
a way to deal with these philosophy of governance differences by pairing up with EU Member 
States that joined the EU in 2004. This organization believes that these new EU Member States 
experts understand what it means to go through the process, which helps with translating and 
transferring knowledge (Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 2017).   
 
In the instances where the philosophy of governance was perceived as rather similar, this also 
led to a smoother cooperation. One official preferred the term ‘phase difference’ over 
‘philosophy of governance difference’. “The things [the BC was] running into where things of 
which our experts said ‘four years ago that’s what we experienced’.” (Twinning Official 8, 
interview, 20 January 2017). Hence, the trainings by Dutch experts on how they handled the 
challenge in the Netherlands was received well as it had a strong overlap with how the BC 
experts could handle the situation, and proved to be very useful. This is a prime example of 
how organizational structure and culture similarity enhance the knowledge transferred by the 
experts and subsequently play a role in the realization of public sector reform.   
 
The Final Twinning Reports make no references to similarities or differences between the 
philosophy of governance between the BC and the MS, and are therefore not reported here.  
 
In short, it can be included that Hypothesis 3 is also confirmed: the more similar the philosophy 
of governance of the MS experts to the BC, the more likely externally supported public sector 
reform will be realized. 
 
The fsQCA showed that the two variables discussed above are only a sufficient condition when 
in combination with one another. A potential explanation for this is that the variables overlap 
when it comes to politicization and hierarchy. Both elements trouble the reform process by 
imposing sticky procedures that need to be followed to implement the planned programs or 
workshops. While there is some overlap between the variables, they are highly different. 
Furthermore, it is easier to increase the philosophy of governance similarity between Twinning 
partners than changing the level of politicization of the sector, as this latter variable often has 
deep historical roots. In all, structural and political factors play an important role in easing or 
complicating externally supported public sector reform.  
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In conclusion, the results and the interpretation have confirmed all three hypotheses formulated 
in Chapter 3. It has demonstrated that the MS experts matter in catalyzing a successful 
Twinning project. The analysis has shown that externally supported reform is more likely to 
be realized if good quality Twinners are involved, and/or if the sector in which the project takes 
place is not politicized in combination with a similarity between the Twinning partners when 
it comes to philosophy of governance.  
  
Limitations  
This following section will discuss the limitations of the findings presented, and shortly discuss 
the variables that were not examined in this research. 
 
First and foremost, this analysis focused solely on the expert sending side, while the receiving 
end, the beneficiary country, has an equal role in the implementation process. More 
importantly, the observations made by the MS experts were not verified by the beneficiary 
country officials. This poses a limitation to the findings as the experience and interpretation of 
the string of events during the Twinning project may have been interpreted differently by both 
sides of the project. While the original design of the project set out to verify these observations, 
due to the staff turnover at the BC side, this was rather impossible. Yet, the attitude of the staff 
at the BC’s public administration does play an important role in realizing the goals of the 
Twinning Project. Two officials referenced the go-getter mentality of their counterpart as very 
influential in the attainment of the mandatory results (Twinning Official 8, interview, 20 
January 2017; Twinning Official 11, interview, 9 February 2017). On the other hand, the lack 
of interest demonstrated by the BC, for example due to low attendance at workshops, or low 
capacity seemed to influence the Twinning project in a negative way (Twinning Official 7, 
interview, 19 January 2017). Furthermore, Twinning Official 4 (interview, 16 January 2017) 
emphasized how important it is that the Twinning projects are demand-driven to be successful. 
Additionally, the political events, such as demonstrations or elections, may alter the 
administration of the ministry, and consequently the agenda of the ministry, which may cause 
Twinning to suddenly become a very low priority (Twinning Official 1, interview, 14 
September 2016). This research project did not take into account the circumstances in the BC, 
while it might have influenced the philosophy of governance similarity experienced by the MS 
experts, or the degree to which the sector was politicized.   
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The second limitation is that this thesis did not zoom in on the structural obstacles related to 
Twinning that Member States experience when participating in the Twinning instrument. These 
obstacles influence the selection of experts as well as the organizations that can part-take in 
Twinning. The most often frustration mentioned was related to the financial compensation 
Twinners receive for their participation in Twinning (eg. Twinning Official 7, interview, 19 
January 2017; Twinning Official 10, interview, 25 January 2017; Twinning Official 11, 
interview, 9 February 2017). This compensation is often half of what the consultancy fee is of 
the Dutch expert, which makes it difficult for organizations to cover all costs. It has been the 
reason why one of the interviewed organizations decided to quit its participation in Twinning 
(Twinning Official 10, interview, 25 January 2017), why another organization does not 
participate in Twinning Lights, as the costs are even higher (Twinning Official 11, 9 February 
2017), and why a third Twinning Official predicts that the participation of the Netherlands in 
Twinning will be reduced to zero due to the cost of participation (Twinning Official 1, 
interview, 14 September 2016). Another organization said it is the reason why they 
predominantly hire retirees (Twinning Official 7, interview, 19 January 2017). This latter 
choice goes against the original design of the Twinning instrument, namely that the knowledge 
obtained during the Twinning project also benefits the MS’s public administration. If the 
Twinners do not work any longer at the organization, retaining the acquired knowledge and 
experience is rather difficult.  
 
Chapter conclusion  
This chapter presented the analysis that confirmed the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. The 
analysis showed that the expert sending side matters in realizing externally supported public 
sector reform. First of all, the research showed that a good quality Twinner is a sufficient 
condition for externally supported public sector reform. For the RTA, PL and CL roles it is 
best if a leader is selected with strong organizational skills and an extensive professional 
network. For the experts, it is found crucial that a teacher is selected who has extensive 
background knowledge on the topic of the Twinning project, speaks English fluently, has 
excellent presentation skills and is able to culturally empathize with the employees at the BC 
administration. The second condition that is sufficient for externally supported reform is the 
combination of a non-politicized sector and philosophy of governance similarity. When both 
elements are present, this is also a sufficient condition. The findings of this research do have 
some limitations: the research solely focused on the expert sending side without fully including 
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the BC-perspective, and neglected the structural obstacles that are grained into the Twinning 
instrument.  
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Conclusion 
This research set out to examine under what conditions the EU Member States experts are able 
to instigate public sector reform in beneficiary countries of the Twinning instrument. Being the 
first analysis on Twinning that zooms in specifically on the role of the Twinning experts, this 
thesis serves as a contribution to the very limited Twinning literature that predominantly 
concentrates around the 2004 EU enlargement. This research found that the quality of the 
Twinner, and the level of sector politicization in combination with philosophy of governance 
similarity, are sufficient conditions that can make Twinning triumphant. 
 
To investigate what the role of the EU MS experts  is in the success of the Twinning instrument, 
this study zoomed in on the Netherlands as an example of an expert sending EU Member State. 
This research relied on Final Twinning Reports and face-to-face interviews with the Dutch 
Twinners, who have been involved in Twinning projects either as an expert or in a leadership 
role. Subsequently, this data was triangulated through QCA, a set-theoretic method that 
uncovers relationships between phenomena as set relations. As EU externally supported public 
sector reform is influenced by multiple conditions, QCA was the most appropriate method to 
unfold the combination of causal conditions that lead to the realization of public sector reform.  
 
The QCA analysis revealed that the Twinning expert matters. In order to realize externally 
supported public sector reform, it is imperative that the quality of the Twinner is high. 
Twinning is unique as a government-to-government consultancy tool, where the beneficiary 
country can learn from the experiences of their colleagues at EU public institutions. A 
prerequisite to this transfer of knowledge is that the Twinner is capable of sharing that story. 
Therefore, this research found that the experts that participate in Twinning need to have a good 
command of English, are highly knowledgeable on and experienced with the issue matter and 
are empathetic with the culture of the beneficiary country. The analysis also discovered that 
the leadership roles should be fulfilled by those with good organizational skills and people with 
an extensive network of professionals. Furthermore, Twinning projects in non-politicized 
sectors are more successful than in politicized sectors, where the resistance to the reforms 
promoted by the experts is high. Last, it is found that the philosophy of governance similarity 
is crucial for the realization of externally supported public sector reform. The creation of a 
consortium of EU experts, where one of the MSs at least is culturally and structurally close to 
the BC, might also lead to such philosophy of governance similarity.  
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The existing literature on the Twinning instrument continues to be limited. This research sought 
to make a contribution to the knowledge on the role of the expert sending countries. A first step 
in further developing these findings is by conducting the same research in an EU Member State 
with lower government effectiveness, such as Italy or Greece, to challenge the external validity 
of the observations across the EU. Future research could also delve further into the mandatory 
results and the potential financial and political agenda behind the reporting of these results. 
Another interesting avenue to be left explored is the actual success of the instrument: what 
reforms can be attributed to the instrument and what reforms are the cause of financial, political 
or strategic reasons? 
 
In all, the Twinner matters to attain triumph in Twinning – the question left unanswered is if 
Twinning in itself matters.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Overview Dutch participation in Twinning (1998-2016) 
 
Beneficiary 
Country 
Number of Twinning 
projects with NL as lead 
partner 
% of total Twinning 
projects with NL as lead 
partner  
Armenia 1 0.45% 
Azerbaijan 3 1.35% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 0.90% 
Bulgaria 16 7.17% 
Croatia 12 5.38% 
Cyprus 4 1.79% 
Czech Republic 20 8.97% 
Egypt 3 1.35% 
Estonia 13 5.83% 
Georgia 1 0.45% 
Hungary 11 4.93% 
Kosovo 2 0.90% 
Latvia 9 4.04% 
Lithuania 9 4.04% 
Macedonia 6 2.69% 
Malta 6 2.69% 
Moldova 1 0.45% 
Montenegro 3 1.35% 
Morocco 1 0.45% 
Poland 18 8.07% 
Romania 28 12.56% 
Serbia 5 2.24% 
Slovenia  15 6.73% 
Slovakia 15 6.73% 
Tunisia 1 0.45% 
Turkey 16 7.17% 
Ukraine 2 0.90% 
Grand Total 223 100% 
Table 1. Twinning projects with the Netherlands as lead partner (1998-2016). Source: Dutch 
National Contact Point (2016).  
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Sector 
Code 
Sector name Number of Twinning 
projects with NL as 
lead partner 
% of total Twinning projects 
with NL as lead partner  
AG Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
59 26.46% 
CO ? 2 0.90% 
EC Standardization and 
certification Trade 
& Industry 
4 1.80% 
EDU Education 1 0.45% 
EN Energy 13 5.83% 
FI Finance, internal 
market and 
economic criteria 
27 12.11% 
HE Health and 
consumer protection 
6 2.69% 
JH Justice and Home 
Affairs 
42 18.83% 
JLS ? 1 0.45% 
OT Other 32 14.35% 
SPP Social sector 
projects/Structural 
funds 
1 0.45% 
SO Social affairs and 
employment 
24 10.76% 
TE Telecommunications 1 0.45% 
TR Transport 10 4.48% 
Grand 
Total 
Grand Total 223 100.00% 
Table 2. Dutch Twinning projects per sector code (1998-2016). Source: Dutch National 
Contact Point 2016; European Commission 2016.  
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Appendix B - QCA membership scores per variable 
 
Variable Membership score 
Outcome: public 
sector reform 
1 (very satisfactory) 
0.75 
0.51 (satisfactory) 
0.25 
0 (very unsatisfactory) 
Quality of Twinner 1 (very qualified) 
0.75 
0.51 (qualified)  
0.25 
0 (very unqualified) 
Sectoral 
politicization 
1 (very politicized) 
0.75 
0.51 (politicized) 
0.25 
0 (not politicized at all) 
Philosophy of 
governance 
similarity  
1 (very similar) 
0.75 
0.51 (indifferent) 
0.25 
0 (very different)  
Table 3. QCA membership scores per variable  
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Appendix C – Interview questions  
 
1. Kunt u wat meer vertellen over uw persoonlijke achtergrond (organisatie, Twinning 
ervaring)? 
2. Wat is de achtergrond van uw organisatie met Twinning? 
3. Hoe kijkt u naar het succes van Twinning (het behalen van de doelen gesteld in het 
Action Plan)? 
a. Wat zijn volgens u de bronnen van succes en falen? 
b. Wat is de rol van het monitoren van de EU en andere betrokken partijen 
hierin? 
c. Voor de projecten waar u aan meedeed, op een schaal van 1-5 (very 
unsatisfactory tot very satisfactory) à hoe scoort u de projecten qua resultaat? 
d. Kunt u wat vertellen over de veranderingen in het Twinning instrument sinds 
uw organisatie’s deelname?  
4. Welke rol speelt de Twinner? 
a. Maakt het uit wie is de RTA? Waarom? 
b. Maakt het uit wie is de PL? Waarom? 
c. Maakt het uit wie is de CL? Waarom? 
d. Score eigen kwalificaties per project (taal, achtergrond over land, eerdere 
ervaring Twinning, leiderschap kwaliteiten, vakinhoudelijke kennis) 
e. Score kwalificaties van medeproject personen per project (RTA, PL, experts – 
vanuit sending MS)  
5. Welke rol speelt de sector?  
a. Tot hoeverre was de sector gepolicitiseerd? (1-5: totaal niet gepoliticiseerd-
heel erg gepoliticiseerd) 
b. Waren er veel partijen betrokken (bv. NGOs)? Waren deze partijen 
verschillend van aard? 
6. Wat was de invloed van de institutionele structuur en cultuur in zowel de organisatie 
als het land? 
a. Machtsafstand/hierarchisch systeem 
b. Ingebed of losse activiteit 
c. Hoe anders was de organisatie cultuur van de Nederlandse (philosophy of 
governance)? (1-5: very different – very similar)  
7. Kent u ervaringen van andere Twinners die haaks staan op de uwe? Wat denkt u dat 
daarvan de bron is? 8. Heeft u nog toevoegingen?			
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Appendix D – Interviews 
 
Available upon request 
 
Interview 1: Twinning Official 1 (T1), 14 september 2016, Component Leader  
 
Interview 2:  Twinning Official 2 (T2), 19 oktober 2016, RTA/Project Leader  
 
Interview 3: Twinning Official 3 (T3), 13 januari 2017, Project Leader/RTA 
 
Interview 4: Twinning Official 4 (T4), 16 januari 2017, Project Leader 
 
Interview 5: Twinning Official 5 (T5), 18 januari 2017, Project Manager 
 
Interview 6: Twinning Official 6 (T6), 18 januari 2017, Project Leader  
 
Interview 7: Twinning Official 7 (T7), 19 januari 2017, Project Manager 
 
Interview 8: Twinning Official 8 (T8), 20 januari 2017, Project Leader 
 
Interview 9: Twinning Official 9 (T9), 25 januari 2017, Project Leader 
 
Interview 10: Twinning Official 10 (T10), 25 januari 2017, Expert/project manager 
 
Interview 11: Twinning Official 11 (T11), 9 februari 2017, Project Leader  
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Appendix E – R script  
 
### QCA ANALYSIS: TRIUMPH IN TWINNING ### 
 
getwd() 
setwd("~/Documents/R") 
 
library(QCA); library(QCA3); library(SetMethods); library(lattice); 
library(QCAGUI); library(betareg); library(foreign); library(psych); 
library(directlabels); library(QCAtools) 
 
## Load Data 
cTwinning <-read.csv(file="fuzzysetccombi.csv", header=TRUE) 
head(cTwinning) 
attach(cTwinning) 
 
## Check data  
describe(cTwinning) 
plot1(FINAL.DV, jitter = TRUE, cex = 0.8) 
 
## Tables for necessary condition  
QCAfit(cbind(cTwinning$IV1, cTwinning$IV2, cTwinning$IV3), 
cTwinning$FINAL.DV, cond.lab = c("Quality of Twinner", "Sector 
politicization", "Philosophy of Governance"), necessity  = TRUE) 
 
## XY plot 
XYplot(IV1, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, jitter.x = TRUE, relation = "nec") 
dev.print(pdf, 'xyplotTnec1.pdf') 
XYplot(IV2, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, relation = "nec") 
XYplot(IV3, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, relation = "nec") 
 
#Quality Twinner 
ntable1<-table(cTwinning$IV1, cTwinning$FINAL.DV) 
ntable1 
 
#Sector politicization 
ntable2<-table(cTwinning$IV2, cTwinning$FINAL.DV) 
ntable2 
 
#Similarity philosophy of governance  
ntable3<-table(cTwinning$IV3, cTwinning$FINAL.DV) 
ntable3 
 
# Sufficient condition 
stable1<-truthTable(cTwinning, outcome = "FINAL.DV", conditions="IV1, 
IV2, IV3", incl.cut=0.900, sort.by="incl,n", show.cases=TRUE) 
stable1 
stable1$tt 
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## XY plots 
XYplot(IV1....IV2....IV3, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, xlab="T * ~S * ~P", ylab = 
"Outcome", relation = "suf") 
dev.print(pdf, 'xyplotTsuf2.pdf') 
XYplot(IV1...IV2....IV3, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, xlab="T * S * ~P", ylab = 
"Outcome", relation = "suf") 
dev.print(pdf, 'xyplotTsuf5.pdf') 
XYplot(IV1....IV2...IV3, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, xlab="T * ~S * P", ylab = 
"Outcome", relation = "suf") 
dev.print(pdf, 'xyplotTsuf6.pdf') 
XYplot(IV1...IV2...IV3, FINAL.DV, cTwinning, xlab="T * S * P", ylab = 
"Outcome", relation = "suf") 
dev.print(pdf, 'xyplotTsuf8.pdf') 
 
### Logical minimization 
 
# conservative solution  
csTwinning<-eqmcc(stable1, details = TRUE, show.case=TRUE, 
row.dom=FALSE, use.tilde=FALSE) 
csTwinning 
 
# parameters of fit - intermediate solution  
pof("X.IV1....IV2...IV3 => FINAL.DV", data = cTwinning) 
 
 
